President Donald Trump’s decision to capture former Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro was in keeping with his promise that America would focus more attention on the Western Hemisphere. Maduro is under U.S. federal indictment and accused of trafficking cocaine to the United States. Maduro also retained power despite losing his country’s last presidential election. If he’s found guilty, the American people deserve the opportunity to hold him accountable for the damage he’s done to our society.
Secretary of State Marco Rubio was right when he suggested that being a dictator can’t protect someone forever from facing American justice. The operation that captured Maduro was impressive and reminded the world what the United States can accomplish. The Chinese oil tanker that changed course away from Venezuela demonstrates how our actions will reverberate beyond Latin America, reducing China’s access to cheap energy and removing one of Russia’s few friends in the world.
For all the potential positives, however, we may find ourselves bogged down in another unplanned overseas commitment. It’s too early to know how well President Trump and his administration have planned for the post-Maduro future, but the president’s statement that the U.S. would administer Venezuela is a bad sign. Unlike Iraq and Afghanistan, where the United States toppled governments and then tried to create replacements, Venezuela has a relatively well-organized and functional opposition that enjoys popular support. Given this, it’s not clear why the U.S. would need to administer the country.
Edmundo González Urrutia, whom the U.S. believes won Venezuela’s 2024 election, has been in exile in Spain. He could conceivably return to lead the country if Maduro’s regime accepts him as the new president and the military treats him as the new commander in chief. Without these, it would take a popular uprising or the backing of U.S. military forces to install Urrutia in power, both of which present risks and would make the operation to capture Maduro seem ill-advised. If Venezuela descends into disorder, or if order is only maintained by an American occupation, continuing to isolate Maduro and weaken him over time begins to look like it would have been the better option.
The best hope for achieving a positive outcome is if President Trump, working through America’s intelligence agencies, has already convinced the Maduro regime to turn over power to an opposition in waiting, or to remain in place and change its posture toward the United States. Perhaps the biggest mistake made in the aftermath of our 2003 invasion of Iraq was to disband the Iraqi Army before another force was ready to maintain order. If the president’s plan is to leave Maduro’s government and the Venezuelan military mostly intact, we might avoid a bad outcome. In time, however, the Venezuelan people may decide they don’t want to be governed by the remnants of Maduro’s corrupt regime, and the United States may be forced to choose between allowing that regime to repress the Venezuelan people or finding a way to facilitate a peaceful transfer of power. Neither option is easy or appealing.
Beyond the political situation, President Trump’s comments about the Venezuelan oil industry indicate that the U.S. plans to use its power to control Venezuela’s natural resources. Before he was elected in 2016, the president was a consistent critic of U.S. policies that allowed foreign companies to profit from Iraqi oil, believing these profits rightfully belonged to the United States since we were the occupying power. The president seems determined to act differently in Venezuela by assuming control of Venezuelan oil as part of his planned administration of the country. Given the current oversupply of oil in world markets, it’s not clear that increasing Venezuelan production, even if the benefits flow to American taxpayers and shareholders, is worth the immense effort it will take to modernize Venezuela’s facilities.
Separate from the practical implications of Maduro’s capture, the president’s use of military power without congressional authorization reopens long-standing questions about the extent to which any president can direct military action. After Vietnam, the War Powers Resolution of 1973 was meant to curb the ability of presidents to enter our country into armed conflicts without support from Congress. The practical effects of the legislation have been limited, since presidents have complied with its mandate to report the use of military force to Congress, and Congress has subsequently agreed to fund these operations after the fact. Presidents are habituated to the idea that Congress will give them the resources they need to continue the conflicts they begin.
Former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Secretary of State Colin Powell was skeptical of launching the Iraq War because he believed that once the U.S. took this action, it would be responsible for managing the aftermath. The journalist Bob Woodward summarized this view as “if you break it, you own it.” The Trump administration is highly critical of the decisions that led to the Iraq War and especially critical of traditional Republican figures like Powell. It should have nonetheless considered Powell’s ideas about ownership after action and meticulously planned for how Venezuela would govern itself, or be governed, in a post-Maduro future.
If Venezuela slides into disorder, our reputation will be harmed, a flood of migrants may leave the country and we’ll have created an opening for the Russians and Chinese to recreate an anti-American regime. If the Maduro government remains in power with a new leader, we may find ourselves supporting an oppressive and criminal administration against the will of the Venezuelan people. And if we increase the flow of Venezuelan oil, we may inadvertently depress prices. This would hurt the Russians, who rely on oil for a large portion of their income, but also a friendly country like Saudi Arabia, upon whom we’re relying for help to rebuild Gaza and otherwise shape the Middle East. The decisions we make in a post-Maduro Venezuela will echo across the world.
The Trump administration may succeed in replacing Maduro with a government that’s friendly to American interests and avoid the worst outcomes of regime change. For that to happen, detailed planning should have occurred in the months leading up to Maduro’s capture. Our intelligence agencies should have lined up support from the country’s power brokers, and our analysts should have a clear understanding of what’s about to happen.
Even if the administration gets this right, Congress should look for ways to reinsert itself into these decisions. The president needs the ability to act quickly to protect American lives, but Maduro posed no imminent risk to our nation. The past 25 years have shown that the effects of toppling leaders are difficult to predict and that having more rather than fewer perspectives leads to better outcomes. Bringing Maduro to the United States to stand trial is a legitimate action, but his capture only makes sense if what follows in Venezuela is better than what preceded.
Colin Pascal (colinjpascal@outlook.com) is a retired Army lieutenant colonel who served as the director of operations for the U.S. Army Foreign Counterintelligence Activity. He is a graduate student in the School of Public Affairs at American University and lives in Annapolis.
